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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s*
Lynn S. Scott*
and William B. Shearer III***
This Article surveys noteworthy cases in the areas of corporate,
partnership, and limited liability company law decided during the survey
period' by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the
United States district courts located in Georgia. This Article also
summarizes enactments at the 2006 Session of the Georgia General
Assembly to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") with
2
respect to commerce, corporation, partnership, and associations law.
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1. The survey period runs from June 1, 2005 through May 31, 2006.
2. No noteworthy amendments were made to Title 7 (Banking and Finance) of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") during the 2006 Session of the Georgia
General Assembly.
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CORPORATIONS

Piercingthe Corporate Veil

1.
Eleventh Circuit Affirms Holding that Corporation Is
Allowed to Pierce Its Own Corporate Veil for Claim Against
Former Principal in Bankruptcy. In Baillie Lumber Co. v.
Thompson, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 2004
holding by the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia that an alter ego claim against a corporation's principal was a
cause of action rightly belonging to a creditor group as a whole, rather
than a specific creditor.4 As a result, the corporation's bankruptcy
estate properly included the alter ego claim, and individual creditors
were prohibited from pursuing causes of action outside of the corporation's bankruptcy with respect to the allegations presented in the alter
ego claim.5
In 2004 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an alter ego
claim was common to all creditors but was not convinced that a Georgia
corporation could bring an alter ego claim against itself and certified the
issue to the Georgia Supreme Court.6 On April 26, 2005, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that (1) Georgia law will allow a representative of
a debtor corporation to pursue an alter ego claim against the corporation's former principal and (2) a former principal "found liable under an
alter ego theory should be liable for the entirety of the corporation's
debt."7 Based on the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the alter ego action by the corporation's bankruptcy estate against the principal is allowed under Georgia
law.' The court also confirmed that the alter ego action is property of
the bankruptcy estate and subject to the automatic stay of the bankruptcy court that would prevent individual claims by creditors or shareholders outside of the corporation's bankruptcy proceedings.9

3. 413 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005).
4. Id. at 1295.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7.

Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 279 Ga. 288, 292, 293, 612 S.E.2d 296, 300, 301

(2005).
8. Baillie, 413 F.3d at 1295.
9. Id.
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2.
Individual Liability Under Alter Ego Doctrine Is Not
0 the
Permissible Under Title VII Claim. In Dearth v. Collins,"
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the alter ego doctrine did
not permit individual liability to be imposed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") against a president, director, and sole
shareholder of an employer." While the case primarily addressed relief
under Title VII, Dearth reinforced Georgia law with respect to the alter
ego doctrine. 2
Brandi M. Dearth, a former employee of Info Pro Group, Inc. ("Info
Pro"), sued Richard L. Collins, Info Pro's president, director, and sole
shareholder, asserting that he repeatedly made sexual advances towards
her and violated Title VII. Dearth argued that even if, as a general
matter, individual employees may not be held liable under Title VII, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals should make an exception to the rule
based on application of the alter ego doctrine by piercing the corporate
veil under Georgia law.'"
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Dearth's position for
two reasons. 4
First, nothing in Title VII supports a claim that
individual capacity liability can be imposed on the basis of the alter ego
doctrine. 5 Second, and more importantly, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that Dearth failed, as a matter of law, to establish
that Collins was in fact Info Pro's alter ego.' 6 In reaching its decision,
the court outlined three essential elements required to pierce the
corporate veil under the theory of alter ego doctrine in Georgia:
"[T]o establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown (1) that the
stockholders' disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere
instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; (2) that there
is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities
of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and (3) to adhere to
the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect
fraud." 7

10.
11.

441 F.3d 931 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 932.

12.

Id. at 934-35.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

932-33.
933.
933-34.
934.
934-35 (quoting McLean v. Cont'l Wingate Co., 212 Ga. App. 356, 359, 442

S.E.2d 276, 279 (1994)).
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Dearth presented no evidence that Collins disregarded the corporate
form, that he used Info Pro to transact his own affairs, or that he hid
behind the corporate form of Info Pro to protect fraudulent behavior.1 8
The court held that "adherence to the doctrine of corporate entity in this
case does not promote injustice or protect fraud." 9 Moreover, the court
stated that "[t]he problem with the 'alter ego' theory [of individual
liability in Title VII cases] is that it seeks to impose liability upon
shareholders without a showing of fraud or injustice." ° Because
Georgia law expressly requires a showing of fraud or injustice, the court
rejected Dearth's argument that she should be allowed to sue and
recover against Collins individually under Title VII. 2'
B.

Miscellaneous

1. Reverse Stock Split Resulting in Redemption of Shareholder
Does Not Create Special Injury Authorizing Direct Action In
Haskins v. Haskins,22 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Catoosa Bancshares, Inc.
("CBI") and Joseph M. Haskins, Rebecca Haskins, and A. Russell
Friberg, Jr. (collectively, the "CBI Defendants") relating to claims for
breach of fiduciary duties, conversion, and oppression of minority
shareholders." At the heart of the issues in Haskins was the claim by
Drewry E. Haskins III ("Haskins III") that he incurred a special injury
separate and distinct from other shareholders and was thereby
authorized to bring a direct action against CBI.24 The Georgia Court
of Appeals disagreed with Haskins III and affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of CBI and the CBI Defendants.25
CBI was a closely-held corporation but not a statutory close corporation."
Drewry E. Haskins, Jr. ("Haskins Jr."), Haskins III, Joseph
Haskins (Haskins Jr.'s second son), A. Russell Friberg, Jr., various
members of the Haskins family, and a trust-created for estate planning

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 262 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an alter ego
theory of individual capacity liability in a Title VII lawsuit against the president of a
company)) (second alteration in original).
21. Id.
22. 278 Ga. App. 514, 629 S.E.2d 504 (2006).
23. Id. at 514-15, 629 S.E.2d at 505.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 515, 629 S.E.2d at 505.
26. Id. at 514, 518, 629 S.E.2d at 505, 508.
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purposes-held all outstanding shares of CBI. Haskins Jr. founded and
controlled CBI prior to his death, and while Joseph Haskins assumed
leadership roles at CBI and was elected to the board of directors of CBI,
Haskins Jr. became estranged from Haskins III. Under the terms of
Haskins Jr.'s will at the time of his death, all of Haskins Jr.'s stock in
CBI was transferred to Joseph Haskins. Notwithstanding the terms of
the will, Haskins III claimed that he had an oral agreement with his
father to inherit the stock and filed for a temporary restraining order to
prohibit the transfer of shares to Joseph Haskins. In addition to the
case in Georgia, Haskins III initiated litigation in Tennessee with
respect to his claim that he had an oral agreement with his father to
receive his stock in CBI. The Tennessee claim, which related to the
probate of Haskins, Jr.'s will, was not part of the litigation addressed by
the Georgia Court of Appeals.27 The trial court initially granted the
temporary restraining order but later permitted the transfer to Joseph
Haskins. As a result of the transfer, Joseph Haskins owned the majority
of the outstanding shares of CBI.28
After the transfer of Haskins Jr.'s shares to Joseph Haskins, CBI's
board of directors authorized a four thousand to one reverse stock split.
In connection with the reverse stock split, the authorized shares of stock
in CBI were reduced from 200,000 shares to fifty shares. At the time of
the reverse stock split, the only shareholder with more than 4000 shares
was Joseph Haskins. Because Haskins III held less than 4000 shares,
his shares, along with the shares of all shareholders other than Joseph
Haskins, were to be exchanged for cash in the amount of $427 per
share.29
Haskins III argued that he should have been able to maintain a direct
action because he suffered special damages."0 The Georgia Court of
Appeals disagreed and held that the case was simply about the fair
market value of the shares." Once the court of appeals concluded that
the case was limited to the mere valuation of the shares, the Georgia

27. Id. at 516, 629 S.E.2d at 506.
28. Id. at 515-16, 629 S.E.2d at 505-06.
29. Id. at 516-17, 629 S.E.2d at 506-07. While the price to be paid per fractional share
was not expressly addressed by the court of appeals, it is interesting to note that the board
of directors of CBI authorized a payment of $467 per share, CBI actually paid Joseph
Haskins $434 per share for a redemption of shares shortly after Haskins Jr.'s death, and
CBI only offered $427 per share to Haskins III. Id. In addition, during the course of the
litigation, Haskins III and his family members ultimately surrendered their shares in CBI
and received the $427 per share that had been deposited into the registry of the court for
their shares. Id. at 517, 629 S.E.2d at 507.
30. Id. at 520, 629 S.E.2d at 509.
31. Id.
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Supreme Court's holding in Grace Brothers, Ltd. v. Farley Industries,
Inc.32 made it clear "that the statutory appraisal remedy in O.C.G.A.
[section] 14-2-1302(b) ... is the exclusive remedy."33 In quoting the
Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals emphasized that
"'[a] remedy beyond the statutory procedure is not available where the
shareholder's objection is essentially
a complaint regarding the price
34
which he receives for his shares.'
Despite his varied claims, Haskins III never claimed that CBI's board
of directors failed to comply with the Georgia Business Corporations
Code3" or CBI's governing documents, nor did Haskins III claim that the
actions were taken by fraudulent or deceptive means. 6 Instead, Haskins
III alleged that: "(1) [CBII acted even though the issue concerning the
ownership of the stock raised by his reliance on the alleged promise by
his father was unresolved; (2) [CBI] redeemed Joseph Haskins's shares
to which [Haskins III] claims ownership; and (3) the proposed reverse
stock split would freeze out minority shareholders."3 7
The court
concluded that Haskins III's "complaint [was] replete with general
allegations that he has suffered injuries separate and apart from the
other shareholders, but his allegations [did] not demonstrate how this
[was] true.""
Pending resolution of the litigation in Tennessee
regarding rightful ownership of Haskins Jr.'s shares, the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that Haskins III's allegations did not demonstrate how
his injuries were separate and apart from that of other shareholders and
that the exercise of his appraisal rights
as set forth in O.C.G.A. section
39
14-2-1302(b) was his sole remedy.
2. No Breach of Fiduciary Duty When Officer and Employees
Solicited Business Accounts Previously Serviced By Their
Former Employer. In Mau, Inc. v. Human Technologies, Inc., the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the
findings of the trial court regarding allegations of breach of the duty of
loyalty and tortious interference with business contracts and relation-

32. 264 Ga. 817, 450 S.E.2d 814 (1994).
33. Haskins, 278 Ga. App. at 518, 629 S.E.2d at 508; Grace Brothers, 264 Ga. at 820,
450 S.E.2d at 817.
34. Haskins, 278 Ga. App. at 518-19, 629 S.E.2d at 508.
35. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (2003 & Supp. 2006).
36. Haskins, 278 Ga. App. at 519, 629 S.E.2d at 508.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 518-19, 520, 629 S.E.2d at 508, 509.
40, 274 Ga. App. 891, 619 S.E.2d 394 (2005).
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ships. 4 Herbert Dew, a former vice president of MAU, Inc. ("MAU"),
and several other former employees of MAU resigned in May 1999 to
form Human Technologies, Inc. ("HTI"), a competing company to
MAU. 4' In response to the formation of HTI, MAU sued Dew, HTI, and
the other former MAU employees who joined HTI. Dew acknowledged
that, "while employed by MAU, he owed it a duty not to use company
time or his knowledge as an officer to advance a competing business."4
As part of their employment arrangements, Dew and the other former
MAU employees signed noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements with
MAU. 45 However, the trial court found that the noncompete and
nonsolicitation agreements were unenforceable.48 MAU did not appeal
the trial court's finding with respect to the noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements.47
The record showed, through affidavits and depositions, that prior to
leaving MAU, neither Dew nor any of the other former MAU employees
(1) contacted or solicited any MAU customers on behalf of HTI, (2) took
any confidential documents or information from MAU, or (3) divulged,
disclosed, or used any confidential information of MAU in setting up
HTI.45 In determining whether Dew breached his fiduciary duty of
loyalty, the court focused on O.C.G.A. section 14-2-831(a)(1)(C), 49 which
allows a corporation to sue an officer or director for "[t]he appropriation,
in violation of his duties, of any business opportunity of the corporation."5 ° The court analyzed the facts of MAU in light of the Georgia
Supreme Court's two-prong test (whether an opportunity was in fact a
business opportunity rightfully belonging to the corporation and whether
the officer in acquiring such opportunity violated his fiduciary duties of
loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing) for determining whether an officer
should be liable for wrongful appropriation of a business opportunity.51

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

45.

Id.

891-92, 897, 619 S.E.2d at 395, 399.
892-93, 619 S.E.2d at 395-96.
891-92, 619 S.E.2d at 395.
892, 619 S.E.2d at 395-96.

46. Id. at 892 n.2, 619 S.E.2d at 396 n.2. The Georgia Court of Appeals did not explain
the trial court's rationale for invalidating the noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements.

Id.
47.

Id.

48. Id. at 893, 619 S.E.2d at 396.
49. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-831(a)(1)(C) (2003).

50. MAU, 274 Ga. App. at 894, 619 S.E.2d at 396.
51. Id., 619 S.E.2d at 396-97; see Se. Consultants v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 246 Ga. 503,
273 S.E.2d 112 (1980).
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The threshold question in determining whether there has been a
wrongful appropriation of a business opportunity is determining whether
there was in fact a business opportunity that rightfully belonged to the
corporation."
Absent the finding of a corporate opportunity, the
directors or officers who pursued the opportunity for personal benefit
will not be liable. 3 Quoting United Seal & Rubber Co. v. Bunting,5 4
the court of appeals noted that "'[a] business opportunity arises from a
"beachhead" consisting of a legal or equitable interest or an "expectancy"
growing out of a pre-existing right or relationship."'5 5 In United Seal
the Georgia Supreme Court held that although the company had longstanding dealings with its customers, and the sales from these customers
accounted for much of its income, there was no contractual arrangement
between the company and its customers; instead, the court noted that
the customers did not have an exclusive arrangement with the company,
and "'the opportunity suggested was an ongoing [one] with no finite
aspect."'56 Also, the Georgia Court of Appeals in MAU noted that "[t]he
burden of proof with regard to the threshold question [of whether an
opportunity presented to a corporate fiduciary is a 'corporate' opportunity] rests 'upon the party attacking the acquisition."'57
With respect to the case at hand, MAU's only argument for the alleged
breach was mere speculation of a business opportunity having arisen
before Dew left his employment with MAU; however, this argument was
directly contradicted by affidavits and depositions.55 As a result, the
court did not need to reach the issue of whether a breach of a duty of
loyalty occurred because MAU had not satisfied its burden of proof to
show a business opportunity even existed. 9 With respect to MAU's
claim for tortious interference, the court held "there was no legal duty
of defendants which could have been breached as the basis for a tortious
interference claim" because the trial court invalidated the noncompete
and nonsolicitation provisions in the employment contracts and because
appellants did not appeal that ruling.6 °

52. MAU, 274 Ga. App. at 894, 619 S.E.2d at 397.
53. Id.
54. 248 Ga. 814, 285 S.E.2d 721 (1982).
55. MAU, 274 Ga. App. at 894, 619 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting United Seal, 248 Ga. at 815,
285 S.E.2d at 721).
56. Id. (quoting United Seal, 248 Ga. at 816, 285 S.E.2d at 723) (brackets in original).
57. Id. at 895, 619 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Phoenix Airline Servs. v. Metro Airlines, 260
Ga. 584, 587, 397 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1990)) (brackets in original).
58. Id. at 893, 895, 619 S.E.2d at 396, 397.
59. Id. at 895, 619 S.E.2d at 397.
60. Id. at 896, 619 S.E.2d at 398.

2006]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

In dicta, however, the court noted that "[e]ven were there proof of such
a business opportunity, copying and using customer lists of a former
employer in setting up a new competing business, absent a valid
noncompete or nonsolicitation contract, is not a breach of a fiduciary
duty."6' While this parting statement appears only in dicta, it is a
provocative statement and may give some practitioners pause. The
statement clearly addresses breach of fiduciary duties, but other
underlying legal concepts (for example, intellectual property rights)
should be considered and cannot be disregarded.
II.
A.

PARTNERSHIPS

Verbal PartnershipAgreement Fails for Lack of Consideration

In Wnuk v. Doyle,62 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment and held that two partnerships were
not formed when the verbal agreements that allegedly formed the
partnerships did not describe the consideration the prospective partner
was to contribute for her partnership interests in each partnership.6 3
In 2002 Carol Wnuk entered into discussions with Larry Garner to
acquire Garner's fifty percent interest in land he jointly owned with Leta
Doyle. Once Garner agreed to sell the land to Wnuk, the two entered
into a written agreement to acquire Garner's fifty percent interest in the
land. Several liens encumbered the property, and Wnuk, Garner, and
Doyle all endeavored to release the liens. Garner borrowed $50,000 from
Wnuk to satisfy the liens and repaid Wnuk $75,000 one year later. In
connection with the sale of the property by Garner to Wnuk, Wnuk and
Doyle attempted to qualify for a bank loan to finance part of the
acquisition. The bank appraised the property and Wnuk and Doyle each
paid one-half of the appraisal fee. Wnuk and Garner's contract included
a closing condition that Wnuk would qualify for a bank loan on or before
May 13, 2003. Wnuk did not close her purchase before the May 13, 2003
deadline, in part, because Wnuk was unable to obtain the financing.
After Wnuk was unable to obtain the financing, she introduced two
additional potential partners, Tom Parson and Henry Phillips, to Doyle
in connection with purchasing the property. Doyle and the two new

61. Id. at 895 n.6, 619 S.E.2d at 397 n.6 (citing Bacon v. Volvo Serv. Ctr., 266 Ga. App.
543, 546, 597 S.E.2d 440, 444 (2004)).
62. 276 Ga. App. 550, 623 SE.2d 740 (2005).
63. Id. at 552-53, 623 S.E.2d at 742-43.
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partners ultimately agreed to purchase and develop the property on their
own and did not include Wnuk.6
Wnuk claimed to have had a verbal agreement with Doyle to develop
the property dating back to when they attempted to seek the bank
financing in February 2003. Wnuk also claimed that the original verbal
partnership agreement with Doyle was expanded to include the two new
partners when she introduced the partners to Doyle in May 2003. Doyle
disputed Wnuk's assertions and claimed that the only agreement she
had with Wnuk was to help Wnuk obtain bank financing in connection
with Wnuk's proposed purchase of Garner's fifty percent interest in the
property. 5
The Georgia Court of Appeals focused on Wnuk's admission that there
had never been a discussion of the amount she was to have paid for
either partnership interest she claimed was verbally agreed upon.66 As
a result, the court held that the "omission of the essential term of
contract consideration rendered by the alleged verbal agreements [was]
too indefinite to be enforced."67
B. Written PartnershipAgreement Upheld Even Though Consideration Not Expressly Stated
In Antoskow & Associates, LLC v. Gregory,68 the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and held
that (1) assent to partnership constituted consideration because a person
who allows herself to be held out as a partner in a business is bound for
the partnership's contracts and (2) the document allegedly creating a
partnership "unambiguously stated that [the person] was a partner in
ownership of the subject property."69
In 2000 Christopher P. Antoskow and Carolyn M. Gregory executed a
document entitled "In Death Do Us Part." ° One particular sentence

64. Id. at 550-52, 623 S.E.2d at 741-42.
65. Id. at 552, 623 S.E.2d at 742.
66. Id. at 552-53, 623 S.E.2d at 742.
67. Id. at 553, 623 S.E.2d at 742.
68. 278 Ga. App. 468, 629 S.E.2d 1 (2005).
69. Id. at 470-72, 629 S.E.2d at 4-5.
70. Id. at 469-70, 629 S.E.2d at 2-3. The text of the writing is as follows:
On this day, January 18, 2000, 1, Christopher P. Antoskow will state the following:
If I, Christopher P. Antoskow, dies with out [sic] Carolyn M. Gregory, and we are
still together, she will receive 30% of the Jessica-Morgan Building .... If
Christopher P. Antoskow and Carolyn M. Gregory are not together at that time
she will receive 20%. In any case in incident, Carolyn M. Gregory [will receive]
a percentage as a partner in ownership of this property. On the sale of said
property, Carolyn Gregory, will receive the said above percentage of whatever the
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unambiguously states that Gregory is "a partner in ownership of this
property."7
When determining whether a partnership has been
created, the court stated that "the true test to determine whether a
partnership has been created is the intention of the parties."7 2 Because
Gregory assented to the partnership by allowing herself to be held out
as a partner in the business pursuant to the terms of the written
partnership agreement, the court, applying the rules of contract
construction, held that the contract evidenced the partnership and that
Gregory's assent to partnership constituted adequate consideration.73
Although Antoskow was decided less than one month after Wnuk, the
Georgia Court of Appeals seems to have reached a different conclusion
with respect to whether the consideration (as opposed to mere assent to
the partnership) was required to be expressly set forth in a partnership
agreement. One key distinction between the two cases is that the
alleged partnership agreement in Wnuk was a verbal agreement, but the
alleged partnership agreement in Antoskow was a written agreement.
The differing results are arguably in line with prior Georgia precedent
with respect to the importance of public filings and other written
instruments in determining the intent of the parties.7 4
From a practical perspective, to the extent that a person holds himself
out as a partner to the public via a written instrument or filing, it
appears that the Georgia courts will more readily find that a partnership
has been formed even if the exact amount of consideration has not been
stated expressly in the document.
III.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

A. Statutory FiduciaryDuties May Be Modified or Amended by an
OperatingAgreement
In Ledford v. Smith,7 5 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
fiduciary duties owed among members of a Georgia limited liability
company may be modified or eliminated (with a few exceptions) by an

total sale may be at the time of the sale of the property. This was agreed upon
by both parties involved in this legal document.
Id. (brackets in original).
71. Id. at 470, 629 S.E.2d at 3.
72. Id., 629 S.E.2d at 3-4.
73. Id. at 470-71, 629 S.E.2d at 4.
74. See Accolades Apartments, L.P. v. Fulton County, 279 Ga. 257, 612 S.E.2d 284
(2005).
75. 274 Ga. App. 714, 618 S.E.2d 627 (2005).
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operating agreement.16 The duties that limited liability members owe
to one another under the Georgia Limited Liability Company Act are set
forth in O.C.G.A. section 14-11-100." 7 As set forth in the Georgia
Limited Liability Company Act, any fiduciary duties that a member may
owe to another member of a limited liability company may be modified
in a written operating agreement, and the members or managers may
in good faith rely upon the provisions of a written operating agreement
for the limitation of the scope of their duties."
Quoting Stoker v.
Bellemead,9 the Georgia Court of Appeals stated:
[tihe contractual flexibility provided in [O.C.G.A. section 14-11-305] is
consistent with O.C.G.A. [section] 14-11-1107(b) of the LLC Act which

76. Id. at 724-25, 618 S.E.2d at 636.
77. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-100 (2003). In relevant part, the Georgia Limited Liability
Company Act provides that:
In managing the business or affairs of a limited liability company:
(1) A member or manager shall act in a manner he or she believes in good faith
to be in the best interests of the limited liability company and with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances. A member or manager is not liable to the limited liability
company, its members, or its managers for any action taken in managing the
business or affairs of the limited liability company if he or she performs the duties
of his or her office in compliance with this Code section. Except as otherwise
provided in the articles of organization or a written operating agreement, a person
who is a member of a limited liability company in which management is vested
in one or more managers, and who is not a manager, shall have no duties to the
limited liability company or to the other members solely by reason of acting in his
or her capacity as a member;
(4) To the extent that, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Code section or otherwise
at law or in equity, a member or manager has duties (including fiduciary duties)
and liabilities relating thereto to a limited liability company or to another member
or manager:
(A) The member's or manager's duties and liabilities may be expanded, restricted,
or eliminated by provisions in the articles of organization or a written operating
agreement; provided, however, that no such provision shall eliminate or limit the
liability of a member or manager:
(i) For intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; or
(ii) For any transaction for which the person received a personal benefit in
violation or breach of any provision of a written operating agreement; and
(B) The member or manager shall have no liability to the limited liability company
or to any other member or manager for his or her good faith reliance on the
provisions of a written operating agreement, including, without limitation,
provisions thereof that relate to the scope of duties (including fiduciary duties) of
members and managers.
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305 (2003).
78. Ledford, 274 Ga. App. at 723-24, 618 S.E.2d at 635-36.
79. 272 Ga. App. 817, 825, 615 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2005).
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provides that: "It is the policy of this state with respect to limited
liability companies to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom
of contract and to the enforceability of operating limits." 0
Dyna-Vision Group, LLC ("Dyna-Vision"),5 ' Brenda Smith, Bryan
Ownbey, and Bob Thomas (collectively, the "Active Members") formed
Signature Hospitality Carpets ("SHC"), a limited liability company, in
1998. The Active Members constituted the management, employees, and
officers of SHC, and Dyna-Vision acted as the financial partner to
provide credit and management assistance. Pursuant to the terms of
SHC's operating agreement, both Dyna-Vision and the Active Members
had the right to force a mandatory buy-sell. At the end of 2001 and
beginning of 2002, SHC entertained offers for a sale of SHC to Shelby
Peeples. However, Dyna-Vision's management believed SHC was worth
more than the value offered by Peeples and refused to sell.82
Once SHC rejected Peeples's offer, Peeples negotiated separately with
the Active Members and entered into a letter of intent whereby Peeples
would loan the Active Members $3.5 million to purchase Dyna-Vision's
interest in SHC. The loan was to be secured by SHC's assets. Upon the
Active Members' purchase of Dyna-Vision's interest in SHC, Peeples
would purchase all of SHC's assets from SHC (which, at that time,
would be a wholly-owned by the Active Members). The Active Members
did not disclose the negotiations or letter of intent to Dyna-Vision or its
representatives. 3
On February 25, 2002, the Active Members presented a "Notice of
Offer to Sell or Purchase" to Dyna-Vision in accordance with SHC's
operating agreement. While Dyna-Vision initially considered buying the
Active Members' interests, it ultimately decided to sell its interests for
the $3.5 million as provided in the "Notice of Offer to Sell or Purchase."
After Dyna-Vision had sold its membership interests in SHC, DynaVision claimed that there had been a mutual mistake of fact while it had
been a member and made a written demand that SHC reconvey certain
land and a building that was known as "the Green Road Property" to
Signature Leasing Corporation ("SLC")."4
When SHC refused to

80. Ledford, 274 Ga. App. at 724, 618 S.E.2d at 636 (quoting Stoker v. Bellemead, 272
Ga. App. 817, 825, 615 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2005)).
81. Dyna-Vision Group, LLC was formed and owned by Jimmy Ledford, Larry O'Dell,
Bryan Walker, and two others. Id. at 715, 618 S.E.2d at 630.
82. Id. at 715-17, 618 S.E.2d at 630-31.
83. Id. at 717-18, 618 S.E.2d at 631-32. However, the court noted that in any event,
there was evidence that Dyna-Vision knew that Peeples was negotiating separately with
the Active Members. Id. at 718, 618 S.E.2d at 632.
84. Id. at 718-19, 618 S.E.2d at 632-33. Jimmy Ledford, Larry O'Dell, Bryan Walker,
Brenda Smith, and Bryan Ownbey formed SLC, a limited liability company, to purchase
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reconvey the Green Road Property, Dyna-Vision, its owners, and SLC
filed suit claiming mutual mistake and unjust enrichment with respect
to the transfer of the Green Road property; fraud in the transfer of the
Green Road property, in the buyout of Dyna-Vision's ownership interests
in SHC, and in the buyout of SHC; and breach of fiduciary duties owed
by the Active Members to Dyna-Vision in handling SHC's finances and
in conducting the buyout.85
The SHC operating agreement reveals that the only obligation of the
Active Members to Dyna-Vision or of Dyna-Vision to the Active Members
with respect to proposed transfers of interests was to disclose to the
other any "bona fide offer from a third party to 'purchase' their
'ownership interest' in SHC."8
The trial court concluded that the
provision was intended to prevent outsiders from buying into SHC and
would permit the Active Members to maintain some control over who
their business partners were to be. Based on the structure of the
agreement between Peeples and the Active Members, the trial court
concluded that no third party would buy into SHC to become DynaVision's business partner. Not only was Peeples to acquire assets of
SHC, but Peeples would also acquire assets of SHC after the buyout of
Dyna-Vision's interest in SHC by the Active Members.87 As a result,
the court held that (1) "neither the financing for the buy-out nor the
asset purchase arrangement implicated the disclosure provisions of
Paragraph 9.2.1 of the [SHC] Operating Agreement" and (2) "the trial
court did not err in granting summary judgment to [the Active Members]
on the issue of whether the [SHC] operating agreement required the
Active Members to disclose to Dyna-Vision Peeples's involvement in the
buyout.""'
More specifically, Paragraph 7.3 of SHC's operating agreement
expressly permitted the members of SHC to do the following:
"engage in all such other business ventures, including without
limitation ventures involving the purchase, sale and operation of other
businesses, but no Active Member shall engage in businesses similar
to the business of [SHC] by competing with the business of [SHC] while

and hold the Green Road property. SLC then leased the property to SHC and SHC
refinanced and consolidated its debts with FNBC in October 2001, two months before the
negotiations with Peeples began. Id. at 719, 618 S.E.2d at 632.
85. Id. at 720, 618 S.E.2d at 633.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 720-21, 618 S.E.2d at 633-34.
88. Id. at 721, 618 S.E.2d at 634.
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they are employed with [SHC], except for business associations of
Active Members with Vista Carpet Industries, LLC."89
The court held that paragraph 7.3 was "broad enough to allow the Active
Members to negotiate with Peeples for the purpose of obtaining financing
to fund their buyout of Dyna-Vision's interest in SHC."90 The court
further held that the terms of the operating agreement, which allowed
the business opportunity that occurred, eliminated any obligation that
the Active Members may have owed to Dyna-Vision with respect to such
a business arrangement. 9'
In Ledford the Georgia Court of Appeals reinforced the general
understanding that a well-drafted operating agreement may reduce or
eliminate any implied duties or fiduciary obligations from one member
to another.92 Georgia practitioners should pay careful attention and
note the extent to which the fiduciary duties provisions in operating
agreements may be an issue in the overall structure of a transaction.
B. OperatingAgreement Provisions Trump Georgia Limited Liability
Company Act
In Alimenta (USA), Inc. v. Oil Seed South, LLC,93 the Georgia Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against
both Alimenta (USA), Inc. ("Alimenta") and Oil Seed South, LLC ("Oil
Seed").94 Alimenta involved a dispute among the joint venture partners
in Mid Georgia Processing, LLC ("Mid Georgia"), a limited liability
company owned fifty percent by Alimenta and fifty percent by Oil
Seed.95
After the parties formed the joint venture, cottonseed oil prices
dropped precipitously and forced the parties to incur additional debt to
finance the ongoing operations. Alimenta ultimately advanced more
money than Oil Seed, and Oil Seed did not match the contributions.
Alimenta decided to convert some of its outstanding debt owed by Mid
Georgia into capital contributions. As a result, Alimenta's ownership
interest in Mid Georgia increased to fifty-one percent. Alimenta
ultimately sold Mid Georgia to another entity owned by Alimenta and

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 716-17, 618 S.E.2d at 631.
Id. at 725, 618 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id. at 724-25, 618 S.E.2d at 636.
276 Ga. App. 62, 622 S.E.2d 363 (2005).
Id. at 62, 622 S.E.2d at 365.
Id.
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then sued Oil Seed for indemnification
for the additional cash contribu96
Alimenta.
by
made
tions
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the indemnification
obligation, required pursuant to the operating agreement, applied only
to third parties and not to members.97 Moreover, the court held that
Alimenta's claim was "not supported by a reasonable construction of the
contract."9 8
Oil Seed counterclaimed for fraud in the inducement and breach of
fiduciary duties.99 While the particulars of the alleged conduct were
not specified in the opinion, a portion of the conduct in question occurred
prior to the execution of the operating agreement.'0 ° As a result, the
court held that the merger clause contained in the operating agreement
barred Oil Seed's claims on breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent
inducement. 1 1 Similar to the court's opinion in Ledford, Alimenta
demonstrates the willingness of Georgia courts to enforce contract terms
under a limited liability company operating agreement that are more
specific than Georgia's Limited Liability Company Act.
C. Limited Liability Company Is Distinct Entity Separatefrom Its
Members
In Winzer v. EHCA Dunwoody, LLC, °2 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that "a limited liability company cannot appear in court without
representation by an attorney."0 3 In so holding, the court reinforced
the legal conclusion that "a limited liability company, like a corporation,
is a separate business entity which can act only through its agents."10 4
While Winzer provides little foresight in the way of new case law, it
continues the line of Georgia jurisprudence that a limited liability
company is a stand-alone entity separate and apart from its members.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE

In the 2006 Session of the Georgia General Assembly, the General
Assembly made one revision to Title 10 of the O.C.G.A. regarding

96. Id. at 62-63, 622 S.E.2d at 365.
97. Id. at 65, 622 S.E.2d at 366.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 63, 622 S.E.2d at 365.
100, See id. at 65, 622 S.E.2d at 366-67.
101. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 366.
102. 277 Ga. App. 710, 627 S.E.2d 426 (2006).
103. Id. at 714, 627 S.E.2d at 430.
104. Id.
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investment entities" 5 and numerous revisions to Title 14 of the
10 6
O.C.G.A. regarding corporations, partnerships, and associations.
Specifically, Title 10 of the O.C.G.A. was amended to more clearly reflect
that Georgia may either directly or indirectly, through an investment
entity, make investments using Georgia's Seed-Capital Fund.0 7
Title 14 of the O.C.G.A. contained multiple revisions. 10 8 A condensed
summary of noteworthy revisions are as follows:
1. The Georgia General Assembly added O.C.G.A. section 14-2-305
and revised multiple sections of the O.C.G.A. to provide that a board of
directors can commit a corporation to submit a matter for shareholder
approval even if the board of directors subsequently decides to recommend against it. 109 The text of O.C.G.A section 14-2-305 is as follows:
Subject to the requirements set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection (b)
of Code Section 14-2- 1003, with respect to the submission of amendments to the articles of incorporation to shareholders; paragraph (1) of
subsection (b) of Code Section 14-2-1103, with respect to the submission
of a plan of merger or share exchange to shareholders; paragraph (1)
of subsection (b) of Code Section 14-2-1202, with respect to the
submission of a disposition of assets requiring shareholder approval to
shareholders; and paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of Code Section 14-21402, with respect to the submission of a proposed dissolution to
shareholders, a corporation may agree to submit a matter to a vote of
its shareholders regardless of whether the board of directors determines at any time subsequent to adopting or approving such matter
that such matter is no longer advisable and recommends that the
shareholders reject or vote against the matter."0
This legislative revision is particularly important in the acquisition
context when a potential acquirer knows there may be competing bidders
for a particular company and the acquirer wants its deal to be submitted
to the shareholders even if another "superior" bid causes a board of
directors to change its recommendation. This type of provision is also
known as a "force the vote" provision that practitioners may include in
no-solicitation or no-shop provisions in acquisition agreements.

105. See Ga. H.B. 1305, Reg. Sess. (2006).
106. See Ga. S.B. 469, Reg. Sess. (2006).
107. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-10-1, -3 and -4 (2003 & Supp. 2006).
108. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-401, -854, -859, -1003, -1101 to -1104, -1109, -1109.1, -1202, 1302, -1402, -1504, -1506 (2003 & Supp. 2006); O.C.G.A. §§ 14-9-206.2, -902, -905 (2003 &
Supp. 2006); O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-212, -706, -1002, -1101 (2003 & Supp. 2006). The general
assembly also enacted O.C.G.A. sections 14-2-104, 14-2-305, 14-2-1109.2, 14-2-1109.3, 14-9206.8, and 14-11-906 (Supp. 2006), and repealed O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1008.
109. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-305, -1003, -1103, -1202, -1402 (2003 & Supp. 2006).
110. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-305.
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2. The General Assembly revised O.C.G.A. sections 14-2-854 and 142-859 to provide for the advance payment of expenses to a director before
determining a director's ultimate entitlement to indemnification.'
3. The General Assembly revised multiple sections of Title 14 of the
O.C.G.A. to clarify existing law by expressly recognizing the possibility
of different treatment of shareholders in a plan of merger or share
exchange (i.e., some holders of a single class of stock may be required to
accept securities, property, or cash, while the remaining holders of the
same class of stock may be required to accept different securities,
property, or cash)."'
4. The General Assembly revised multiple sections of Title 14 of the
O.C.G.A. to change certain provisions relating to the election to become
a limited liability company, to streamline the process of permitting an
entity to convert from one form into another, and to allow entities
organized
in other states to convert to corporations or partnerships in
113
Georgia.

111.
112.
113.

O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-854, -859.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1101, -1102, -1109, -1302.
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1109.1, -1109.2, -1109.3.

